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COMMENTS

Conscientious Objection in an All-Volunteer
Military: An Impermissible Accommodation
of Religious Freedom?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Nothing contained in this title [War and National Defense Selective Service Act] shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.'
The War and National Defense Selective Service Act and its accompa-

nying regulations are the focus of a renewed debate concerning the validity of allowing active-duty service personnel to separate from the services
on the grounds of conscientious objection to war.2 In the past, constitu-

tional analysis of conscientious objection challenges focused on the Free

Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.8 The underlying premise of this

analysis was that the government lacked authority to compel a citizen to
1.

50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1990).

2. This Comment addresses only the issue of whether active-duty service personnel who
volunteered should be allowed to seek discharge as a conscientious objector. For a general
discussion of whether a constitutional right to conscientiously object exists, see Fredrick L.
Brown, Stephen M. Kohn & Michael D. Kohn, Conscientious Objection: A Constitutional
Right, 21 NEw ENG. L. REv. 545 (1885-86).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. . "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free exercise [of
religion]." Id.
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against his conscience by compelling military service.' Central to the
"analysis was the ability of the government to compel a citizen to "provide
for the common defense," generally through the vehicle of military conscription or the draft.'

-act

Changes in the nature of military service, specifically the advent of an
all-volunteer military, limited enlistment contracts, and the lack of a
draft necessitate a re-evaluation of the constitutional status of the conscientious objection as it applies to active-duty service personnel. Particularly, both the basis for the constitutional analysis and its underlying premise require change. We should, in the future, premise constitutional
analysis on the other religious provision in the First Amendment, the Establishment Clause.' The underlying premise is that the government,
through the elaborate military process established to evaluate and determine the "depth and sincerity" of a service person's religious belief, has
in effect established a national religion or, alternatively, conveyed a message of endorsement of religion that violates the Establishment Clause.'
In an attempt to accommodate an individual's religious liberty, the military has created a process that has institutionalized a set of acceptable
beliefs.' These beliefs give deference to traditional religions and religious
beliefs, which imposes religious norms upon members of the service.
This Comment asserts that the process established by the military to
evaluate conscientious objection claims is inherently unconstitutional. By
analyzing the military's process' in light of recent Supreme Court decisions,10 this Comment will show that the process has created an impermissible establishment of a national religion. Because of this establishment, the lack of compulsory military service, and the limited nature of
enlistment contracts, the military should abolish conscientious objection
as a basis for separation from active military duty.

4. The United States Supreme Court has not directly ruled on this premise. See Brown,
Kohn & Kohn, supra note 2.
5.

See 50 U.S.C. app. § 454 (1990).

6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of
religion." Id.
7.

See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).

8.

See 32 C.F.R. § 75 (1991).

9.

32 C.F.R. §§ 75-75.9 (1991).

10. Employment Division, Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990); County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch

v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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II.

THE HISTORICAL FUNCTION OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

Nothing ... shall be construed to require any person to be subject to
combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States
who, by reason of religious training ....

"

The Court has not directly addressed the issue of whether a right of
conscientious objection exists under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.12 The Court has, however, consistently analyzed conscientious objection claims in light of the Free Exercise Clause."' The Court
considered it relevant that challengers were compelled into service rather
than enlisting voluntarily.1 4 This coercive element of military service was
an essential element of Free Exercise claims.' In the conscientious objection cases, the Court assumes that Congress, through its war powers, can
legislatively grant an exemption to those it would force to serve. The
Court has not directly considered whether exemptions based on religion
create deferential treatment that violates the Establishment Clause. 1 ' Instead, the Court has focused on the individual seeking the exemption, not
7
on the government's creation of a review structure based on religion.'
The historical significance of religious liberty and its place in the Constitution figure prominently in any analysis of conscientious objection
cases. The right of freedom of conscience has been espoused since the
Revolutionary War. In July 1775 the Continental Congress passed the
first national conscientious objection statute. 18 During the Revolutionary
War, General Washington refused to force the Quaker population to fight
11. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1990).
12. In Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 113-15 (1971), Justice Douglas urged the
Court to address the matter. However, the Court has consistently refused. See, e.g., United
States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 288 (1970); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 n.23
(1971); and Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974).
In a series of cases concerning whether the government could compel immigrants who
were pacifists to sign an oath "to take up arms in defense of the country," the Court explicitly denied a free exercise claim, concluding that an overriding principle of the Constitution
requires all citizens, without regard to religious beliefs, to bear arms if Congress so desires.
See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 664 (1928); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S.
605 (1931); United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1935).
13. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970).
14. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
15. For a comprehensive discussion of conscientious objection and the Free Exercise
Clause, see Brown, Kohn & Kohn, supra note 2.
16. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 n.23 (1971).
17. The Court addresses only those issues raised by the individual and generally does
not address other related constitutional issues.
18. 'See R.R. Russell, Development of Conscientious Objection Recognition in the U.S.,
20 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 409 (1951-52).
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in violation of their pacifist consciences even though they were needed to
defend Philadelphia." During the Civil War, the Supreme Court held
that the right of freedom of conscience was a right to a freedom "forever
inviolable," regardless of the military consequences.2 0 The Court stated
that a "country, preserved at the sacrifice of all the cardinal principles of
liberty, is not worth the cost of preservation.""1 During World Wars I and
II, as well as during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, accommodations
22
were made for those who were opposed to war because of their religion.
These accommodations included a total exemption to military service, alternative civilian service, and noncombatant military service.28
By creating the alternatives and exemptions to military service, Congress recognized the country's historical accommodation to an individual's freedom of conscience.2 4 However, "Congress can grant or withhold
exemption from the draft at its discretion because 'the duty of citizens by
force of arms to defend our government [was] a fundamental principle of
the Constitution.' ""' The Court's concern with forcing an individual into
active military service in violation of their conscience was justified until
active military conscription ended in 1974. Congress and the military
have opted for an all-volunteer military;2 1 thus, no one is compelled to
"provide for the common defense. 27 Individual adults now enter into
limited enlistment contracts with the military.28 Absent compulsory military service, the Court should base its analysis of the military's continued
allowance of the conscientious objection exemption for active duty service
personnel upon the Establishment Clause.

III.

RELIGION BY ANY OTHER NAME

Is

STILL AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Our cases interpreting and applying the [Establishment Clause] have
made such a maze . . .that even the most conscientious governmental
officials can only guess what motives will be held unconstitutional. We
19. 7 THE WRMTNGS O
January 19, 1777).

GEORGE WASHIMNGTON 34-35

(J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1931) (letter dated

20. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 126 (1866).
21. Id. at 126.
22. See, e.g., Executive Order No. 10,028, 14 F.R. 211 (1949); Executive Order No.

11,803, 39 F.R. 33,297 (1974).
23. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1990).
24. See Brown, Kohn & Kohn, supra'note 2, at 557-58.
25. Id. at 558 (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 620 (1931)); see also.
Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (federal conscription law held constitutional).
26. See Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-500 (1988).
27. U.S. CONST. preamble.
28. For a thorough discussion of the contractual obligations as they impact conscientious
objection status, see Modern Status of Military Enlistment Contracts, 62 A.L.R. FED. 860

(1988).

1992]

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

755

have said essentially the following: Government may not act with the
purpose of advancing religion, except when forced to do so by the Free
Exercise Clause (which is now and then); or when eliminating existing
governmental hostility to religion (which exists sometimes); or even when
mere accommodating governmentally uninhibited religious practices, except that at some point (it is unclear where) intentional accommodation
results in the fostering of religion, which is of course unconstitutional."

While a framework has long existed whereby one can analyze whether
government has advanced, inhibited, or excessively entangled itself with
religious affairs,30 the Court has not developed a coherent working definition of "religion" for constitutional purposes. 1 The Court. fears that by
defining religion it will limit or even exclude certain individually held beliefs from First Amendment protection and that this exclusion may itself

violate the Free Exercise Clause.32 The Court has implied that government must remain neutral towards religion or religious matters.33 However, to remain neutral, the Court must first identify what constitutes a

religion or religious belief.
Congress, however, has not always remained neutral. In response to

conflicting court decisions,3 Congress defined religion, as applied to those
"who by reason of religious training and belief, [are] conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form," as "an individual's belief in
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, socio35
logical, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.1

29. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
30. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
31. See Mark E. Chopko, Intentional Values and the Public Interest-A Plea for Consistency in Church/State Relations, 39 DR PAUL L. REV. 1143 (1988).
32. Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology, 41 STAN. L. Rav. 233, 241 (1990).
33. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,
607 (1961). For further discussion, see Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the
Supreme Court, 29 U. CH. L. REv. 1 (1961).
34. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943) (defining religion as "a
response of the individual to an inward mentor, call it conscience or God, that is for many
persons at the present time the equivalent of what has been thought a religious impulse");
Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir.) (holding that regardless of how devoted an individual may be to his belief system, "without the concept of deity [it] cannot be
said to be religious"), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
35. 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560(j) (1958). Congress amended this statute to remove its affirmative definition of religion. It presently reads: "As used in this subsection, the term 'religious
training and belief' does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views
or a merely personal code." War and Defense Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j)
(1990). The question still remains: what is "religious training and belief"?
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As theistic as this definition appears, the Court developed very creative
interpretations to accommodate traditionally nonreligious beliefs. s6 In
United States v. Seeger,"7 the Court held the choice of the term "Supreme Being," rather than "God," manifested a congressional purpose to
"embrace all religions and to exclude essentially political, sociological,
and philosophical views." s The Court defined religious belief as a belief
"that is sincere and meaningful" and "occupies a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who
clearly qualifies for the exemption." 3' A belief is "parallel to that filled by
the orthodox belief in God" if it is "based upon a power or being, or upon
a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately
dependent."'" In applying its expansive definition of religious belief, the
Court held that Seeger, an acknowledged religious skeptic, came within
the congressional definition."1
In Welsh v. United States,4 2 the Court, in an apparent effort to include
nontraditional beliefs, further expanded its concept of religion to include
those objections to war that were admittedly nonreligious.' 8 Welsh sought

conscientious objector status on his belief that war was wrong based on
his "reading in the field of history and sociology."

The Court held that

regardless of what Welsh stated, his beliefs "function[edi as a religion in
his life."' 6 Although his views were "deeply and sincerely" held beliefs of
a "purely ethical or moral" character and clearly outside those within the
statutory language, the Court held that Welsh's beliefs occupied "'a place
parallel to that filled . . . by God' in traditionally religious persons."' 4"
The Court concluded that the function of the objection controlled over
the form.' 7 Therefore, deeply and sincerely held ethical or 4moral beliefs
are the functional and legal equivalents of religious beliefs. 0
36. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970).
37. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
38. Id. at 166.
39. Id. Those belonging to a recognized church, religious group, or sect such as the
Quakers, are clearly within the exemption.
40. Id. at 166, 176.
41. Id. at 187.
42. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
43. Id. at 341.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 340. The Court held that Welsh's own characterization of his beliefs was not
determinative. Rather, the military (or in this case the Court) must evaluate "the depth and
sincerity of his belief." Id. The Court, in effect, establishes a religious system by making a
legal determination of what constitutes a religious belief.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Ingber, supra note 32, at 260.
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In both Seeger and Welsh, the Court avoided addressing the underlying constitutional issue of whether Congress could adopt a functional definition of religion without violating the Establishment Clause." Congress
has since amended 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j), removing all affirmative statements concerning what constitutes "religious beliefs" in the context of
conscientious objection.50 Congress has explicitly stated that religious beliefs are not those "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical
views or a merely personal moral code."51 Given this new statutory
scheme, Welsh no longer controls as the Court's operative definition of
"religious beliefs." Congress, by amending 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560), directly disposed of Welsh's "functional equivalent" test.
The underlying constitutional issue remains: has the military, in creating a system to evaluate and accommodate "deeply and sincerely" held
beliefs of its members, violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment?
IV.

ACCOMMODATION AND ESTABLISHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
MANDATES OF

A.

Smith

AND

Allegheny

COLLIDE

Accommodation of Religious Beliefs

The "right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability' on
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."' In Smith the Court held that Oregon's
criminal statute prohibiting the use of controlled substances, including
peyote used in traditional Native American religious ceremonies, did not
unconstitutionally infringe upon Smith's First Amendment right to freely
49. In Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1981), Justice Brennan noted that the Court had
previously rejected an Establishment Clause attack upon 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1964 ed.,
Supp. V), "which afforded 'conscientious objector' status to any person who, 'by reason of
religious training and belier was 'conscientiously opposed to war in any form'" because, "on
its face, the statute simply (did] not discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation." 456
U.S. at 246-47 n.23 (citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 441 (1971)). The Court in
Gillette focused on an individual's belief, not on religious beliefs in general. 401 U.S. at 454.
This allowed the Court to avoid the issue of whether Congress or the military was deferential to believers but not nonbelievers. The court did not ask whether this practice of granting conscientious objector status had the effect of communicating a message of government
endorsement or disapproval of religion. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
50. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1990).
51. Id.
52. Employment Division, Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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exercise his religious beliefs." Oregon's prohibition was a "constitutional
generally applicable law" that was within the state's police powers to proscribe the use of illegal drugs and not a law "purposefully" directed at a
particular religious practice." The Court held that the government may,
if it so chooses, make religious accommodations to generally applicable
and otherwise valid laws, but is not constitutionally required to do so."
As applied to the conscientious objection cases, the Court has said: "Our
cases do not at their farthest reach support the proposition that a stance
of conscientious opposition relieves an objector from any colliding duty
fixed by a democratic government."" The military is under no constitutional mandate to allow conscientious objection, particularly on a limited
or "single war" basis.2

Applying Smith, Congress may make religious accommodations to generally applicable laws such as those governing active military personnel."
Congress has authorized the military to create its own internal government structure in order to maintain an efficient and effective national
defense system.6 Thus, the military may choose when and within what
context it will accommodate the individual religious beliefs of active-duty
service personnel. 0s The military's allowance of conscientious objector status falls within this permissible accommodation to religious beliefs. However, the accommodation itself may impinge upon the constitutional mandate against establishment of religion by the government."
B. Establishment of Religion
The Court has held that one purpose of the Establishment Clause is to
prohibit the federal government from establishing or favoring a "national
53. Id. at 889.
54. Id. at 885.
55. Id, at 890.
56. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971).
57. Id. at 461. The right to conscientiously object to all wars is still an open constitutional question. See Brown, Kohn & Kohn, supra note 2.
58. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
59. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
60. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1986). The Court, deferring to the
military's determination of what is essential during peacetime and war to provide for the
common defense held that the military can prohibit the wearing of a nonuniform religious
garb (a yarmulke worn by a Jewish chaplain) in order to promote military discipline and
order, Id. at 507-08, 510.
61. U.S. CONST. amend 1. ("Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of
religion . .

.")
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religion. '' 62 In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,"
the Court held that a free standing creche on the grand staircase of a city
hall was an unconstitutional establishment of religion. 6 ' By adopting Justice O'Connor's two-part analysis," the Court found that the context of
the display sent" 'a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying message
to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.' "66 Additionally, the creche had the effect of communicating
"what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display,"
that of government endorsing religion.6
"The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government
from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from
'making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing
in the political community.' "68 An analysis of the military's process for
determining a service person's conscientious objector status" shows that
the process will not withstand a constitutional challenge under either part
of the Allegheny test. The process communicates to the objective viewer
that the military gives preference to traditional religious beliefs and says
to the nonadherent to these "acceptable" traditional beliefs that their religious views will not be accommodated.
The Process. "Administrative discharge prior to the completion of an
obligated term of service is discretionary with the military service con'7 0
cerned, based on a judgment of the facts and circumstances in the case."
To be discharged from active military service as a conscientious objector,
an applicant must submit the request in writing to the Service Headquarters.7 1 In addition to general biographical information including the religious denomination or sect of the applicant's parents, 2 the application
must contain the following: (1) a "description of the nature of the belief

62. The Establishment Clause "forbade establishment of a national religion, and forbade
"Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91
preference among religious sects or denominations.

(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
63. 494 U.S. 573, 596 (1989).

64. Id. at 596.
65. Id. at 590-94. Justice O'Connor first articulated this test in her concurrence in Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. Allegheny, 494 U.S. at 594.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 593 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U:S. 668, 687 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
69. See 32 C.F.R. ch.1, pt. 75 (1991).
70. Id. at § 75.4(a).
71. Id. at § 75.6(a).
72. Id. at § 75.9(a).

760
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which requires the applicant to seek separation from the military"; 7 (2)
an explanation of how the applicant's "beliefs changed or developed, including an explanation as to what factors (how, when and from whom or
from what source training received and belief acquired) caused the
change in or development of conscientious objection beliefs";"' and (3) an
"explanation as to when these beliefs became incompatible with military
'75
service, and why."
After the application is filed, commanders at levels directed by the Service Headquarters appoint an officer to investigate the applicant's claim.7
The investigating officer compiles and evaluates the applicant's case file.7
A military chaplain interviews the applicant and "submit[s] a written
opinion as to the nature and basis of the applicant's claim, and as to the
applicant's sincerity and depth of conviction."'' 7 A psychiatrist also interviews the applicant and submits a "report of psychiatric evaluation indicating the presence or absence of a psychiatric disorder which would warrant treatment or disposition through medical channels, or such character
or personality disorder as to warrant recommendation for appropriate administrative action."'79 Both reports become part of the applicant's case
file.80 An applicant's unresponsive or uncooperative behavior during the
interviews is noted in the case file."
Once the case file is completed, the investigating officer conducts a
hearing." The hearing has several purposes: "to enable the investigating
officer to ascertain and assemble all relevant facts; to create a comprehensive record; and to facilitate an informed recommendation by the investigating officer and an informed decision on the merits by higher authority."8' Though intended to be informal in character," the hearing takes
on the form of a trial on the merits of the applicant's religious beliefs.
The applicant may present evidence, call witnesses, submit statements
supporting the applicant's beliefs, and cross-examine any witnesses the
military presents."
73. Id. at § 75.9(b)(1).
74. Id. at § 75.9(b)(2).
75. Id. at § 75.9(b)(3).
76. Id. at § 75.6(d).
77. Id. at § 75.6(d)(1).
78. Id. at § 75.6(c).
79. Id.
80, Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at § 75.6(d)(2).

83. Id. at
84. Id. at
85. Id. at

§ 75.6(d)(2)(ii).
§ 75.6(d)(2).
§ 75.6(d)(2)(ii), (iii).
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At the conclusion of the investigation, the investigating officer prepares
a written summary of the investigation." This report includes "the investigating officer's conclusions as to the underlying basis of the applicant's
conscientious objection and the sincerity of the applicant's beliefs, including his reasons for such conclusions."'87 The officer will recommend either
a denial or a grant of conscientious objector status."
This recommendation, along with all supporting materials gathered or
submitted during the investigation, is forwarded to the officer who appointed the investigator. 9 The applicant may submit a rebuttal to the
investigating officer's recommendation. 0 After review "for completeness
and legal sufficiency," the officer "who appointed the investigating officer
shall forward it [the complete record] with his personal recommendation
for disposition, and the reasons therefor, through the appropriate chain of
command to headquarters of the military service concerned."' 1
The headquarters then "make[s] a final decision based on the entire
record,""2 including the two recommendations made below.' 3 Applicants
who are found to be conscientious objectors are discharged, if that is the
recommendation, "for the convenience of the Government,"' 4 not because
the applicant has a right to a discharge. Those applicants who are denied
conscientious objector status may appeal the decision. 5 Pending the appeal, the applicant must perform all of the military duties assigned or
face disciplinary action."
The Criteria. The applicant must establish by clear and convincing
evidence' 7 that the applicant is "conscientiously opposed to war in any
form;" 98 "[wihose opposition is founded on religious training and beliefs;" 9 and "[wihose position is sincere and deeply held." 100
The military has defined "religious training and belief" as:
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91,
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

§ 75.6(d)(3).
§ 75.6(d)(3)(iv).
§ 75.6(d)(3)(v).
§ 75.6(d)(3)(v), § 75.6(e).
§ 75.6(d)(3)(vi).
§ 75.6(e).
§ 75.6(f).

§ 75.7(a).
§ 75.6(e), (f).
§ 75.7(c).
§ 75.5(d).
§ 75.5(a)(1).
§ 75.5(a)(2).
§ 75.5(a)(3).
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[b]elief in an external power or being or deeply held moral or ethical
belief, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately
dependent, and which has the power or force to affect moral well-being.
The external power or being need not be of an orthodox deity, but may
be a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of another, or, in the case
of deeply held moral or ethical beliefs, a belief held with the strength
and devotion of traditional religious conviction. The term "religious
training and belief" may include solely moral or ethical beliefs even
though the applicant himself may not characterize these beliefs as "religious" in the traditional sense, or may expressly characterize them as not
religious. The term "religious training and belief" does not include a belief which rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, expediency, or political views.1"'
The investigating officer must determine whether the applicant's belief
02
falls within the above definition.
The investigating officer uses separate criteria to evaluate those applicants who claim to be members of a recognized church, religious organization, or sect and those who base their claim on moral or ethical
grounds. 0 3 The officer must decide if the applicant's beliefs are actually
"moral or ethical beliefs," or if they are based "solely upon considerations
of policy, pragmatism, expediency, or political views."'' In determining
both the nature and "depth and sincerity" of the nonreligious applicant,
the officer may consider the applicant's
[tiraining in the home and church; general demeanor and pattern of conduct [to determine its consistency with the applicant's asserted belief];
participation in religious [or ethical] activities; whether ethical or moral
convictions were gained through training, study, contemplation, or other
activities comparable in rigor and dedication to the processes by which
traditionalreligious convictions are formulated; credibility of the applicant; and credibility of persons supporting claim.' 05
Thus, the investigating officer judges the validity of both the applicant's
religion and personal beliefs in direct contradiction to Scalia's prohibition
101. Id. at § 75.3(b). Apparently, the military has adopted the expansive definition of
religion enunciated by the Court in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340-41 (1970).
102. 32 C.F.R. § 75.6(d)(2) (1991).
103. Id. at § 75.5(d), (e). If the applicant is "a member of a church, religious organization, or religious sect" and the applicant's claim "is related to such membership," the investigating officer may inquire into "the fact of membership, and the teaching of the church,
religious organization, or religious sect, as well as the applicant's religious activity." Id. at §
75.5(c)(2)(iii)(d). In this process, the officer is deciding both the validity of a belief system

and the validity of an applicant's membership in that system.
104. Id.at § 75.3(b).
105. Id.at 75.5(c)(2)(ii) (emphasis added).
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of placing the government in a position of "[j]udging the centrality of
different religious practices.""
The process assumes that the investigating officer understands or
knows what traditional religious convictions are and how they are formulated. It also assumes that some objective criteria exists against which the
applicant's claim can be evaluated. However, the regulations provide no
objective criteria. Instead, they use analogies to "traditional religious beliefs" in an attempt to establish criteria. 07 Using traditional religious beliefs or organized faiths as the standard implies that these beliefs are preferred to nontraditional beliefs. Reliance on analogous religious traditions
puts the officer in the position of "[]udging the centrality of different
religious practices [which] is akin to the unacceptable 'business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.',,s
This is not the type of acceptable accommodation to religious liberty
envisioned in Smith. Giving a military officer the power to determine if
an applicant's belief is credible, traditional, and sincere directly collides
with the prohibition against the government taking a position on questions of religious beliefs. Deciding which religious beliefs are acceptable
amounts to more than the prohibited "taking a position on questions of
religious beliefs."'" The military communicates to nonadherents that
their beliefs are neither within the acceptable system worthy of accommodation nor equal to it. It effectually becomes an endorsement of traditional beliefs inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.
The process also raises a number of unsettling questions. If the officer
does not know what traditional religious beliefs are or how they are
formed, does the officer seek the advice of church authorities? Which
traditional religious group does the officer seek out for advice? Would different religious authorities give divergent answers? Does choosing one authority over another constitute the "government taking a position on
questions of religious beliefs"?" 0 Would the military's adaptation of a
recognized religion's norms of conduct be giving legal deference to one
organized religion?"' Military reliance on some traditional religion to
make an administrative determination conveys "a message that religion
or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred" over nonreligion."'
While the government is free to make accommodations for religious be-

106. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
107. See 32 C.F.R. § 75.3(b) (1991).
108. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).

109. Id.
110.
111.
112.

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1983).
See Edwards v. Aquillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
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liefs, it is not free to do so at the expense or exclusion of nontraditional
beliefs.
The conscientious objection process makes the military the arbiter of
acceptable religious beliefs."' The military must create some measure of
acceptable traditional religious beliefs to which it can compare an applicant's asserted moral or ethical beliefs. The military must then make a
subjective evaluation of the "sincerity and depth" of the applicant's beliefs.-However, no objective criteria exists upon which the officer can evaluate the applicant's sincerity and depth of beliefs. Thus, the officer must
analogize the sincerity and depth of the applicant's beliefs to that
"clearly found in traditional religious convictions.""' Analogizing to
traditional religions gives an implicit endorsement or recognition comparable to an establishment of religion.'1 By using established religious traditions as the standard for evaluation, the conscientious objection process
adopts a "'preference' for particular religious beliefs constitut[ing] an
[unconstitutional] endorsement of religion." 1 6
The entire process assumes that religion is an identifiable entity-that
we will know it when we see it. But religion is not a thing. Religion or
religious belief is comprised of relationships or sets of relationships similar to kinship, nationality, and politics.11 7 The Court has recognized this
relational quality of religion by framing "tests" for establishment in relationships and the perceptions of relationships.I'
The Court analyzes both the actual and perceived impact of the conscientious objection process on religion or religious beliefs. The Court tries
to determine whether, when viewed in its proper context, the military's
process for evaluating an applicant's sincerity and depth of belief "express[es] some kind of subtle government advocacy of a particular religious message," calls for "comprehensive, discriminating and continued
state surveillance," or establishes "an enduring entanglement" of government with religion.119
The regulations require that the military institute some formal evaluation process based solely on religious considerations. 20 There must be an
113. See 32 C.F.R. § 75 (1991).
114. Id. at § 75.5(c).
115. See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94

(1989).
116. Id. at 593 (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987)).
117, Schneider, Nationality, Kinship, and Religion in America, in SYMBOLIC ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER IN THE STUDY OF SYMBOLS AND MEANING (J. Dolgin, D. Kemniter & D.

Schneider, eds. 1977).
118. See Lynch, 465 U.S. 678-79: "The line between permissible relationships and those
barred by the Clause ...

"

Id.

119. Id. at 680.
120. See 32 C.F.R. 75 (1991).
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investigation, a formal hearing process, and a decision based solely on re-

ligious beliefs. Each element creates "an enduring entanglement" of government with religion and religious beliefs.2 The government's continued use of time, resources, and personnel constitutes a continuing
government entanglement of the most enduring quality. Objectively, the
military's process for evaluating an active duty service person's application for discharge on the basis of conscientious objection to war violates
the Establishment Clause.
These questions remain: Is the military's administrative accommodation of religious beliefs a sufficient interest to allow the military's establishment of religion to stand? On what basis is the process to be evaluated: a strict scrutiny test requiring a compelling interest as in Allegheny,
or a reasonableness test requiring only a rational basis as in Smith?
These questions require an in-depth discussion of the relationship of the
military to its members and the extent of the war powers of Congress.
Neither of these questions is the subject of this Comment.'2"
V.

CONCLUSION

The military, in its attempt to accommodate the individual's religious
liberty, has established a process that endorses traditional religious beliefs. This endorsement fails the two-part analysis of Allegheny and constitutes an establishment of religion. The military should discontinue the
allowance of conscientious objection by an active-duty member.
MARY P. SULLIVAN

121.

Id.

122. See Thomas R. Folk, Military Appearance Requirements and Free Exercise of Religion, 98 MIL. L. REv, 53 (1982).

